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	 Adjusted	gross	income	 1990	 	 2010	
	 	 40,000‐50,000	 34.5	 	 39.2	
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purchase	price,	the	statutory	limits	may	be	criticized	as	unduly	generous	in	their	
support	of	residential	housing	at	quadruple	the	average	price.		While	low	and	
moderate	income	individuals	may	need	some	tax	relief	to	aid	them	in	buying	and	
carrying	a	home,	many	of	these	taxpayers	claim	the	standard	deduction	and	get	no	
benefit	from	the	interest	deduction.		As	noted	earlier,	the	availability	of	the	standard	
deduction	means	that	the	net	benefit	of	the	interest	deduction	amounts	to	the	sum	
of	itemized	deductions	less	the	standard	deduction	multiplied	by	the	marginal	tax	
rate.		For	many	moderate	income	homeowners	the	net	benefit	is	quite	small.		At	the	
other	end	of	the	income	scale,	mortgage	amounts	in	the	seven	figures	strongly	imply	
that	the	purchasers	do	not	require	federal	assistance	in	housing	their	families.		The	
extension	of	the	tax	subsidy	to	its	current	levels	proceeds	more	from	political	rather	
than	humanitarian	justifications.		Mortgage	limits	at	their	current	level	benefit	
primarily	upper	middle	class	homeowners.		Further,	since	home	prices	vary	
significantly	by	region,	a	$1	million	mortgage	seems	less	extraordinary	in	New	York	
City	or	Hollywood,	where	political	clout	may	be	particularly	strong,	than	in	Omaha	
or	Texarkana.			
	
The	Code	does	not	adjust	the	limiting	numbers	for	inflation.		As	a	
consequence,	the	ceiling	numbers	lose	real	buying	power	on	a	gradual	but	
cumulative	basis.		The	value	of	the	$1	million	limit,	enacted	in	1986,	has	declined	
since	then	to	the	equivalent	of		$	462,963.				Inflation	acts	in	an	unobtrusive	way	to	
reduce	the	real	value	of	the	mortgage	ceiling	and	to	curb	the	more	extravagant	
aspects	of	the	interest	deduction.		
	
	
Homeowners	receive	an	added	tax	benefit	when	they	sell	a	home.		Upon	the	
sale	of	a	principal	residence	owned	and	occupied	for	a	stated	minimum	period,126	a	
single	individual	may	exclude	from	income	gain	up	to	$250,000;	a	husband	and	wife	
filing	a	joint	return	may	exclude	up	to	$500,000.		Any	excess	gain	incurs	tax	at	long	
term	capital	gain	rates.127		For	2013	the	exclusion	reduced	estimated	tax	revenue	by		
$18	billion.128		The	maximum	dollar	exclusions	are	unadjusted	for	inflation	and	the	
cap	on	benefits	conferred	by	the	provision	slowly	declines.	
The	current	exclusion	provision	enlarged	upon	and	replaced	two	earlier	
provisions.		One	provided	for	nonrecognition	of	gain	on	the	sale	of	a	principal	
residence	if	the	taxpayer	reinvested	an	amount	at	least	equal	to	the	proceeds	of	sale	
in	a	new	residence.		A	taxpayer	thus	could	move	to	successively	more	expensive	
homes	without	incurring	tax.		The	other	created	an	exclusion	for	older	homeowners’	
sales	of	their	homes.		The	policy	sought	to	mitigate	the	lock‐in	effect	for	their	
																																																																																																																																																																					
23/ehs‐01‐2015‐single‐family‐only‐2015‐02‐23.pdf	(for	existing	single	family	
homes)	
126	The	taxpayer	must	have	owned	and	used	the	property	as	the	principal	residence	
for	at	least	a	two‐years	out	of	the	preceding	five	years.		
127	A	homeowner	may	not	deduct	any	loss	on	sale	of	a	personal	residence,	Reg.	sec.	
1.165‐9(a).	
128		
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housing		An	elderly	couple	contemplating	sale	of	their	home	might	be	deterred	from	
selling	by	the	potentially		large	capital	gain,	while	instead	holding	the	property	until	
death	would	give	the	heirs	a	step‐up	in	basis	and	eliminate	any	tax	on	the	gain.			The	
current	provision	enlarged	the	exclusion	and	eliminated	the	“rollover”.	
	
Alimony	and	property	settlements	
	
	 The	Code	applies	different	tax	rules	to	three	elements	of	divorce	settlements.		
A	spouse	who	pays	alimony	as	defined	in	the	statute	can	deduct	that	amount	and	the	
recipient	spouse	includes	it	in	income.129		The	payor	of	child	support	payments	or	
property	settlements,	however,	cannot	deduct	them	and	the	recipient	does	not	
include	them	in	income.130		Congress	sought	to	limit	the	ability	of	divorcing	couples	
to	disguise	property	settlements	as	alimony	by	making	large	initial	payments	
labeled	as	alimony.		To	do	so,	the	Code	includes	“excess	alimony	payments”	in	the	
income	of	the	payor	spouse	in	the	third	year	after	the	separation	and	allows	a	
comparable	deduction	to	the	recipient	spouse.131		The	computation	formula	allows	a	
fixed	amount,	$15,000,	to	avoid	excess	alimony	treatment..		This	amount	has	
remained	unchanged	since	its	adoption	in	1986.		In	the	interim,	its	real	value	has	
declined	in	real	terms	to	$	6,944.		As	a	result,	the	recomputation	potentially	affects	
divorce	settlements	to	a	greater	extent	in	real	terms	than	originally	intended.				
	
Group	term	life	insurance	
	 The	Code	includes	in	the	income	of	an	employee	the	cost	of	group	term	life	
insurance	purchased	by	an	employer.132		It	excludes	the	cost	of	$50,000	of	the	
insurance.		The	amount	of	the	exclusion	has	not	changed	since	1964	when	the	
provision	entered	the	Code.133		The	real	value	of	the	insurance	benefit	covered	by	
the	exclusion	has	declined	by	87%.134		This	provision	may	confer	a	tax	benefit	that	
would	receive	little	support	if	proposed	today,	but	any	effort	to	repeal	the	provision	
likely	would	generate	political	opposition.		A	slow	repeal	by	inflation	serves	a	
similar	goal	without	fuss.	
	
Casualty	loss	deduction	
	 The	Code	allows	individuals	to	deduct	losses	from	fire,	storm,	shipwreck	or	
other	casualty	subject	to	two	limitations.135		One	limitation	reduces	the	deductible	
loss	from	a	casualty	by	$100.136		Originally	intended	to	prevent	claims	for	fender	
bender	accidents,	the	dollar	amount	has	remained	at	the	same	level,	except	for	a	
brief	period,	and	has	not	been	adjusted	for	inflation.		The	effect	of	the	$100	
																																																								
129	I.R.C.	§§	71(a)	and	215(a).	
130	I.R.C.	§71(c).	
131	I.R.C.		§71(f).	
132	I.R.C.	§79(a).	
133	Revenue	Act	of	1964,	Pub	L.	88‐272,	§204(a)(1),	78	Stat.	19.	
134	$50,000	in	2014	was	the	equivalent	of	$6,547	in	1964.	
135	I.R.C.	§165(c)(3)	and	(h).	
136	I.R.C.	§165(h)(1).	
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reduction	has	been	overshadowed	as	a	practical	matter	by	the	second	limitation,	
10%	of	the	taxpayer’s	adjusted	gross	income,	which	radically	reduces	the	number	of	
eligible	claims.137		The	$100	limitation	serves	little	purpose	and	Congress	should	
repeal	it.		In	the	interim,	its	value	slowly	declines	with	inflation.	
	
Administrative	provisions	
	 Inflation	can	affect	administrative	provisions	of	the	Code.		Often,	however,	
they	avoid	the	need	for	direct	adjustments.		As	an	example,	the	six‐year	statute	of	
limitations	for	a	substantial	omission	from	gross	income	applies	to	a	more	than	25%	
omission,	not	to	a	fixed	dollar	amount.138		Less	obviously,		the	requirement	to	file	an	
income	tax	return	applies	when	gross	income	equals	or	exceeds	the	personal	
exemption	plus	the	standard	deduction.139		Both	adjust	annually	for	inflation,	so	the	
filing	threshold	requires	no	further	adjustment.		Occasionally	an	administrative	
level	appears	as	a	fixed	dollar	amount.		The	rules	for	reporting	charitable	
contributions	provide	an	example.	
	 The	Code	ordinarily	accounts	for	property	transactions	by	looking	to	the	
adjusted	basis	of	the	property.140		The	charitable	contribution	deduction	provides	an	
important	exception.		It	measures	the	amount	of	a	contribution	by	its	fair	market	
value.141		Any	appreciation	over	adjusted	basis	goes	untaxed	but	increases	the	
amount	of	the	contribution	deduction.		While	many	gifts	of	property	can	be	readily	
valued	in	publicly‐traded	markets,	many	cannot.		To	prevent	overstatement	of	value	
Congress	has	enacted	a	series	of	stepped	requirements	for	taxpayers	to	describe	the	
property	in	filing	the	tax	return	or	obtain	a	formal	appraisal.	The	Code	defines	
thresholds	for	these	steps	in	fixed	dollar	amounts.		A	taxpayer	who	claims	a	
deduction	of	more	than	$500	for	a	gift	of	property	must	describe	the	nature	of	the	
property.142		With	certain	exceptions,	including	publicly	traded	securities,	for	a	
claimed	deduction	over	$5,000,	the	taxpayer	generally	must	obtain	a	qualified	
appraisal	and	report	the	results	on	the	tax	return.		For	a	claim	over	$500,000	the	
taxpayer	must	attach	the	appraisal	to	the	return.			Failure	to	comply	with	applicable	
requirements	can	result	in	denial	of	the	deduction.	These	amounts	are	not	adjusted	
for	inflation.		As	the	nominal	values	of	property	increase	over	time,	these	
administrative	provisions	will	apply	to	an	increasing	number	of	charitable	gifts.	
	
A	separate	provision	imposes	verification	requirements	on	contributions	of	
vehicles	with	a	claimed	value	in	excess	of	$500.		Another	provision	requires	a	
qualified	appraisal	for	a	single	gift	of	clothing	or	a	household	item	over	$500.		No	
inflation	adjustment	applies	to	any	of	these	dollar	amounts.		Over	time,	as	these	
dollar	amounts	lose	real	value,	we	would	anticipate	that	more	taxpayers	would	
become	subject	to	the	requirements.	
																																																								
137	I.R.C.	§165(h)(2).	
138	Section	6501(e).	
139	Section	6012(a)(1)(A).	
140	I.R.C.	§1011(a).	
141	Treas	Reg	§1.170A‐1(c)(1).	
142	I.R.C.	§170(f)(11)(A)	
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	 Individuals	who	use	their	cars	for	the	benefit	of	exempt	charities	may	deduct	
an	amount	based	on	mileage.		The	deduction	excludes	depreciation	but	does	account	
for	out‐of‐pocket	expenses	such	as	gasoline.		The	Code	currently	fixes	the	applicable	
rate	at	14	cents	per	mile.143		No	inflation	adjustment	applies.	
	
	 No	policy	comes	to	mind	to	justify	the	slow	decline	indollar	boundaries	that	
govern	verification	for	charitable	gifts	in	kind.		Inflation	adjustments	seem	as	
appropriate	for	these	administrative	limitations	as	for	more	substantive	rules.		Nor	
should	the	14‐cent	rule	remain	at	the	same	level	in	the	face	of	rising	out‐of‐pocket	
costs.	
	
	
	
	
	 	
																																																								
143	I.R.C.	§170(i).	
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Conclusion	
	 Taxation	invariably	involves	a	political	process	to	determine	who	pays	and	
how	much.		Even	an	apparently	technical	a	matter,	adjusting	for	inflation,	becomes	
an	arena	in	which	one	group	or	another	may	seek	advantage.		The	indexing	rules	
currently	built	into	the	tax	law	reflect	this	process.	
	
	 The	provisions	for	automatic	inflation	adjustments	in	the	income	tax	raise	a	
number	of	issues.		First,	the	choice	of	the	proper	measure	of	inflation	for	this	
purpose	has	been	called	into	question.		The	chained	CPI	has	gained	acceptance	by	
scholars	in	the	field	as		a	more	accurate	measure	of	consumer	inflation	than	the	CPI‐
u.		Continued	use	of	the	CPI‐u	to	make	tax	adjustments	raises		the	prospect	that	it	
overshoots	the	mark	and	provides	hidden	tax	cuts	as	measured	in	real	value	terms	
for	some	taxpayers.		Second,	the	application	of	widespread	indexation	effectively	
limits	the	political	choices	open	to	legislators.		Without	indexation,	income	taxes	
slowly	creep	up	and	the	legislature	more	easily	can	provide	selective	relief	through	
tax	reductions.		Readjustments	become	more	difficult	when	inflation	adjustment	
occurs	automatically.		On	the	other	hand,	some	observers	support	automatic	
adjustments	precisely	because	the	system	limits	Congressional	discretion	to	give	
selective	relief.		Third,	the	application	of	indexing	to	dollar	amounts	does	not	occur	
uniformly	for	all	tax	provisions.		The	failure	to	index	all	dollar	amounts	in	the	Code	
subjects	some	provisions	to	gradual	reduction	in	real	value	without	the	political	cost	
that	an	effort	to	repeal	the	provision	would	incur.		In	effect,	it	shifts	the	burden	of	
action	from	those	who	would	reduce	or	eliminate	the	provision	to	those	who	would	
preserve	it.		Perhaps	in	the	future,	foes	of	new	or	renewed	deductions	or	credits	
involving	dollar	amounts,	unable	to	defeat	the	proposed	benefit,	may	learn	to	use	
inflation	as	a	functional	limitation.	
	
	
